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Equal Opportunity for Employers:
Elevating the Adverse Employment Action
Standard to Allow Only Meritorious
Retaliation Claims
BY WENDY HYLAND*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. American Values: Freedom of Speech at the Workplace
he Protestant work ethic, as much a part of being American as
baseball and apple pie, permeates our collective psyche and does
much to explain why so many of us sacrifice time with family and friends
to spend the majority of our waking hours at work. As a result, many of us
consider what we do for a living as making up a large part of our identity.
When asked, we explain who we are by what we do. As we strive to
maintain an efficient, healthy economy, employee relationships with their
employers are more important than ever.
Juxtaposed with American pride injob quality and loyalty to employers
is another esteemed American value-the freedom to voice opinions over
issues of concern in the workplace. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 protects this freedom by allowing employees to address concerns of
perceived discriminatory workplace practices or to participate in a
proceeding challenging employer practices without fear of retaliatory
action as a result of this expression.' The anti-retaliation provision, § 704
of Title VII,2 exemplifies the value placed on freedom to speak in this
country, even at times sacrificing the order and harmony in the employer/
employee relationship.
The flip side of the coin involves an assessment of the actions of an
employer following an employee's challenge to discriminatory workplace
"J.D. expected 2002, University of Kentucky.
'42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994) (anti-retaliation provision).2Id
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practice. The determination of appropriate employer action following the
formally expressed concerns of an employee is at the heart of a dispute
between the circuits.3 What constitutes retaliatory action by an employer?
The courts' responses vary widely. Some hold that an employee must be
fired to constitute retaliation, while others state that dilatory remarks by
fellow employees may rise to the level of prohibited retaliatory behavior.4
Striking a balance between an employee's statutory right to challenge
employer practices and an employer's right to manage its employees
without constant fear of exposure to liability for its every move is at the
forefront of the dispute. An employee's right to speak out against employer
practices, as protected by Title VII, is a value that should be guarded
fiercely.5 At the same time, employers should not fear a cry of retaliation
with every negative comment made to an employee subsequent to
exercising her right to speak. The resolution of this issue is critical in
outlining the boundaries of appropriate behavior for employers after an
employee makes a complaint regarding alleged discriminatory practices.
B. Title VII What Does It Protect?
Penning the majority opinion for the Supreme Court in Faragher v.
City ofBocaRaton, Justice Souter highlights an insight that is crucial to the
resolution of the circuit split surrounding Title VII's anti-retaliation
provision: "[a]lthough Title VII seeks 'to make persons whole for injuries
suffered on account of unlawful employment discrimination' its 'primary
objective,' like that of any statute meant to influence primary conduct, is
not to provide redress but to avoid harm." Broadly, Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 protects employees from discrimination by employers
in the workplace.7 Once employees have either opposed unlawful employ-
ment practices of an employer or have participated in an Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") proceeding challenging
employment practices, § 704(a) of Title VII prohibits retaliatory behavior
3 See infra Part II.
4 See infra Part II.
' It is important to note that Title VII protects an employee's right to speak out
regarding employer behavior defined as discriminatory underthe statute. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-3(a). It does not, however, provide employees a general "protesting"
protection. Id
6 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 805-06 (1998) (quoting
Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405,418 (1975)).
7See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
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by the employer." Establishing a prima facie case of retaliatory behavior
requires a showing of: (1) engagement in a protected activity; (2) subjection
to an adverse employment action by the employer; and (3) existence of a
causal link between the protected activity and the adverse action.'
This Note focuses on the heart of the controversy among the circuits
surrounding the scope of the second element's "adverse employment
action" language. Prohibited employer behavior characterized as adverse
employment action varies markedly. Its definition ranges from a liberal
construction of adverse employment action, including such things as mere
changes in the workplace,'0 to a restrictive interpretation characterizing
RkI § 2000e-3(a). The statute reads:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for employment, for
an employment agency, or joint labor-management committee controlling
apprenticeship or other training or retraining, including on-the-job training
programs, to discriminate against any individual, or for a labor organization
to discriminate against any member thereof or applicant for membership,
because he has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified,
assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.
Id
9Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1240 (9th Cir. 2000). Although the quoted
case stems from the Ninth Circuit, other circuits use these elements with minimal
semantic differences. See, e.g., Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 985
(10th Cir. 1996); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973).
" The most widely accepted interpretation, used by the First, Seventh, Ninth,
Tenth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits, is that changes in the workplace constitute an
adverse employment action. See, e.g., Ray, 217 F.3d at 1243-44 (finding that an
elimination of a program, a change in an employee's start time, and changes in
standard procedures constituted adverse employment action); Wideman v. Wal-
Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453,1456 (1 lth Cir. 1998) (holding thatthe "totality"
of several actions by an employer could meet the adverse employment element);
Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1334 (7th Cir. 1996) (recognizing that the
demeaning statements of other employees could meet the "adverse" standard);
Berry, 74 F.3d at 986 (holding that a malicious prosecution action against a former
employee constituted adverse employment action); Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35
F.3d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (recognizing actions ranging from
discharge to toleration of other employee harassment as potentially relatiatory);
Passer v. Am. Chem. Soc'y, 935 F.2d 322, 331 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (finding that
cancellation ofa speaking engagement resulted in professional humiliation and thus
could constitute adverse action).
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only ultimate employment decisions as adverse.' Between these two
extremes, some courts require a finding that employer behavior materially
affects terms or conditions of employment before it constitutes adverse
action.
1 2
C. Persistent Proliferation of Retaliation Claims: Why This Issue is
Important
The grave nature of the controversy surrounding the interpretation of
adverse employment action is illustrated by the ever increasing number of
retaliation suits filed by employees against their employers. Retaliation
suits escalated seventy-two percent between 1992 and 1998,"3 making
retaliation claims twenty-four percent of the total number of claims handled
by the EEOC in that year.'4 In fact, retaliation claims numbered 31,059 in
1998, up from only 7900 just seven years earlier, in 1991."5
What is the explanation for the proliferation of these claims in recent
years? One source indicates that because of widespread knowledge about
sexual harassment, employees are now more apt to stay with the employer
pending the outcome of their claims. 6 Perhaps the increase can be partially
explained by the fact that a plaintiff need not prevail on the discrimination
" The Fifth and Eighth Circuits hold that only ultimate employment decisions,
such as hiring and firing, equate to adverse employment actions. See, e.g.,
Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1143 (8th Cir. 1997) (finding that actions
having only a "tangential" effect on employment do not constitute adverse
employment action); Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708-09 (5th
Cir. 1997) (holding that only "ultimate" employment decisions constitute adverse
employment action within the context of a retaliation claim).
2 See, e.g., Robinson v. City ofPittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)
(holding that the action must have some material affect on the employment to be
"adverse"); Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that
requests made by university officials to an employee asking that she drop sexual
harassment charges filed with the EEOC did not constitute retaliation).
" Michael Higgins, OKY Your Move... Workers and Bosses Get Caught Up
in Chess Game ofBias Charges, Retaliation, EEOC Complaints, 85 A.B.A. J. 26,
26 (1999).
14 Id
5 Diane E. Lewis, The Retaliation Backlash: Working it Out, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 28, 1999, at F4.
16 Pala Wolf, Retaliation Suits, 'Bisexuality Defense'Latest Trends in Work-
place Harassment Action, SUNDAY NEws (Lancaster, Pa.), July 25, 1999, at
Dl.
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claim to win the day on a retaliation cause of action.' Additionally, some
sources claim that juries have become more sympathetic to retaliation
claims by employees, asserting that "[e]mployers have a hard time winning
those [retaliation] claims. Juries may be reluctant to believe that an
employer fired someone for being a woman or being black, but find it
easier to believe that the employer fired the employee for complaining
about supposed discrimination." 8 In fact, the chances of receiving a
favorable jury verdict on a retaliation claim are purported to be fifty-seven
percent. 9 A broad interpretation of adverse employment action has resulted
in the phenomenon of significantly increased litigation in this area. Without
some restraint on the interpretation of unlawful retaliation action by
employers, this litigation will spiral out of control, much to the detriment
of the spirit of Title VII and to all parties involved.
D. Striking the Balance for Employers and Employees: A Roadmap
This Note advocates the adoption of the position of the Second and
Third Circuit Courts of Appeals on adverse employment action, which
requires courts to find that employer behavior materially affected terms or
conditions of employment. This is a minority approach.20 However, it
protects employees from viable threats relating to their employment status
without forcing employers to police their every action following an
employee complaint. Part II outlines the tripartite circuit split. It considers
the analysis used by the majority and minority positions in reaching their
respective conclusions about the scope of employer action covered by the
adverse employment action element of a retaliation claim.2' Part III
considers the term "discrimination" in varying contexts in an attempt to
establish a uniform statutory interpretation. It compares the adverse
1 See Why Retaliation Claims Keep Rising, FED. EEO ADVISOR, Jan. 1999.
Is Retaliation Claims Bedevil Employers, OHIO EMP. L. LETTER, Dec. 1999.
'9 Odds Stack Up Against Employers in Retaliation Suits, DEATH CARE Bus.
ADVISOR, Apr. 27, 1999.
2 The circuits that give a liberal interpretation of adverse employment action
far outnumber the more conservative circuits. Themost conservative cadre consists
of only the Fifth and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals. The middle position is
occupied by the Second and Third Circuit Courts of Appeals. See supra notes 10-
12 and accompanying text. Sheer numeric majority, however, should not
necessarily be dispositive on the most appropriate standard for determining this
issue.21See discussion infra Part II.
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employment action analysis with the underlying purposes of Title VII,
asserting that Title VII is not a "remedial" statute meant to encompass a
broad spectrum of "retaliatory" actions by employers. In addition, this
section analyzes § 703 of Title VII and evaluates its utility in determining
the scope of the anti-retaliation provision in § 704.' Part IV examines the
current EEOC guidelines regarding the nature of adverse employment
action and asserts that their scope encompasses a spectrum of employment
action that is too wide.' Finally, Part V concludes that the lack of a popular
majority does not preclude the intermediate approach from being the most
appropriate standard for adverse employment action.24
II. ORIGINS OF THE TRIPARTITE CIRCUIT SPLIT:
WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ADVERSE EMPLOYMENT ACTION AND
WHY THE LIBERAL AND CONSERVATIVE APPROACHES
Do NOT RESOLVE THE DISPUTE
A. The Liberal Approach
The most liberal group of federal circuit courts identifies changes in the
workplace as satisfying the adverse employment action requirement. The
changes do not necessarily have to have a substantial effect on a term or
condition of employment to be considered retaliatory. Outnumbering the
other two approaches by a significant margin, the number of liberal circuits
is a potential red herring which diverts attention away from questioning the
soundness of their approach. Examining each circuit's opinions reveals that
some interpretations rely on secondary sources rather than examining the
anti-retaliation provision in the context of Title VII's other language,
overall purpose, and relation to Supreme Court decisions regarding a prima
facie discrimination case.
The First Circuit's position on this issue is set forth in Wyatt v. City of
Boston.' The plaintiff, a public school teacher, alleged retaliation by a
Boston public school after "opposing what he viewed as sexual harassment
and for filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission Against
See discussion infra Part I.
2 Although the EEOC guidelines carry some authority, they should not bind
courts as dispositive statements regarding employer action properly characterized
as adverse within the ambit of a retaliation claim. See discussion infra Part IV.
24See discussion infra Part V.
Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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Discrimination."26 The court concluded that lack of choice regarding the
classes plaintiff could teach, negative performance evaluations, and the
denial of a promotion could satisfy the adverse employment action
requirement. The court cited a secondary source as it broadened the
various actions it considered adverse in a retaliation claim.' Wyatt
represents an expansion of the First Circuit's approach to the adverse
employment element that had previously required the employee to be
"subsequently discharged from employment."29
The Seventh Circuit's case law also incorporates a broad spectrum of
behavior as potentially retaliatory3 In Knox v. Indiana, the court held that
demeaning statements of other employees potentially qualify as adverse
employment action and noted that "[tihe law deliberately does not take a
'laundry list' approach to retaliation, because unfortunately its forms are as
varied as the human imagination will permit."31
Similarly, Ray v. Henderson," from the Ninth Circuit, provides the
latest addition to the broadening of the adverse employment element. The
facts involved a plaintiff who claimed retaliation by the Post Office after
he complained to the EEOC of discriminatory practices.33 The nature of the
retaliatory acts included a reduction in salary, elimination of employee
meetings, and elimination of its flexible time schedule.O In holding that the
actions met the adverse employment element, the court succinctly described
the respective positions of the different circuits:
The government urges us to turn from our precedent, and to adopt the
Fifth and Eighth Circuit rule that only "ultimate employment actions"
261d at 14.
27Id at 16.
8 Id at 15-16 (citing Employment Discrimination, § 87.20 at 17-01 to 17-107
(1994)). The court recited the list of"other adverse actions" that constitute adverse
employment action as including "demotions, disadvantageous transfers or
assignments, refusals to promote, unwarranted negative job evaluations and
toleration of harassment by other employees." Id
29 Hoeppner v. Crotched Mountain Rehab. Ctr., Inc., 31 F.3d 9, 14 (1st Cir.
1994) (emphasis added).
30 See, e.g., Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327 (7th Cir. 1996); McDonnell v.
Cisneros, 84 F.3d 256 (7th Cir. 1996).
31 Knox, 95 F.3d at 1334.
32 Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234 (9th Cir. 2000).
3 Id at 1237-39.
34 Id
2001-2002]
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such as hiring, firing, promoting and demoting constitute actionable
adverse employment actions. But we cannot square such a rule with our
prior decisions. Actions that we consider adverse employment actions,
such as... lateral transfers, ... the unfavorable reference that had no
effect on a prospective employer's hiring decisions.... and the imposi-
tion of a more burdensome work schedule ... are not ultimate employ-
ment actions. Nor, for that matter, does the test adopted by the Second and
Third Circuits comport with our precedent. While some actions that we
consider to be adverse (such as disadvantageous transfers or changes in
work schedule) do "materially affect the terms and conditions of employ-
ment," others (such as an unfavorable reference not affecting an em-
ployee's job prospects) do not.35
The Tenth Circuit, another arm of the liberal approach to interpreting
adverse employment action, has as its leading authority Berry v. Stevinson
Chevrolet." In Berry, the court held "that the filing of [criminal] charges
against a former employee may constitute adverse [employment] action."'37
Its basis for this conclusion is that Title VII, at base, is a remedial statute
that should be liberally construed." Therefore, a more flexible, liberal
standard of adverse employment action best comports with the spirit of
Title VII as it was enacted because including a wide range of behavior
facilitates one's opportunity to bring a claim.39 The opinion instructs that
allowing retaliation actions by former employees is inconsistent with a
restricted definition of adverse employment action.' Allowing an employee
to bring a claim, even after the employment relationship has formally
ended, exemplifies the court's broad interpretation of the anti-retaliation
provision.
Finally, Passer v. American Chemical Society,4 in the D.C. Circuit, has
one of the most liberal interpretations of adverse employment action under
the companion anti-retaliation provision of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. The facts involved a chemist who protested his com-
pany's forced retirement policy and then suffered retaliatory action in the
3Id at 1242.
'6 Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980 (10th Cir. 1996).
37 Id at 986.
39 See id
39 Cf id
4o Id ("It would be illogical to define a section 704(a) employee liberally...
and to simultaneously define an adverse employment action narrowly...
4 Passer v. Am. Chem. Soe'y, 935 F.2d 322 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
[VOL. 90
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR EMPLOYERS
form of a last minute cancellation of a forum in which he was the featured
speaker.42 The court believed that the humiliation Passer suffered in his
professional community could render future employment opportunities
more difficult 3 The ability to obtain future employment at least marginally
connects the employer's behavior to some material term of employment
rather than actions that have, at best, only a tangential effect on the
employment relationship.
Imposing a duty on employers to police every negative comment from
one employee to another is too burdensome and unduly interjects the courts
into resolving disputes that may be nothing more than office politics.
Allowing employers a certain degree of autonomy in managing employee
disputes, or in giving unfavorable references when warranted, protects
employers from unlimited retaliation liability for every subjectively
perceived negative action against an employee after she challenges an
employer practice. In the final analysis, these circuits' connection between
actions occurring in the workplace and the element of adverse employment
action is too tenuous.
B. The Conservative Approach
At the opposite end of the spectrum lie the Fifth and Eighth Circuits,
holding that only "ultimate employment decisions" qualify as adverse
employment action." In Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., an employee
claimed retaliation after she was transferred to a different crew, received
a negative evaluation, and allegedly suffered harassment by other employ-
ees following the filing of her sexual harassment and hostile work
environment charges with the EEOCs The court found the actions did not
meet the adverse employment action element as the actions did not rise to
the level ofan "ultimate employment decision."" "[H]iring, granting leave,
discharging, promoting, and compensating" are illustrative examples of
ultimate employment decisions.47 The court stated "[t]he anti-retaliation
provision speaks only of 'discrimination'; there is no mention of the vague
42
1d at 324.
43Id at331.
"See, e.g., Ledergerber v. Stangler, 122 F.3d 1142, 1144 (8th Cir. 1997);
Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 708 (5th Cir. 1997).
41 Mattern, 104 F.3d at 704.
4Id at 708.
47 1d. at 707.
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harms contemplated in [Title VII]. Therefore, [it] can only be read to
exclude such vague harms, and to include only ultimate employment
decisions." '48
The Eighth Circuit similarly holds that ultimate employment decisions
qualify as adverse employment action.49 In Ledergerber v. Stangler, an
employee-supervisor alleged retaliation when her maintenance staff was
reassigned and replaced with new staff. This action was taken subsequent
to the plaintiff's opposition to her employer's implementation of policies
"deferential" to African-Americans. 50 The court found that the reassign-
ment in staff may have resulted in plaintiff's "loss of status and prestige,"
but that it did not rise to the level of retaliation."1 The court explained,
"[w]hile the action complained of may have had a tangential effect on her
employment, it did not rise to the level of an ultimate employment decision
intended to be actionable under Title VII."'52
Allowing only ultimate employment decisions to be considered adverse
employment action is the opposite of too little court interference in the
workplace after an employee has challenged an allegedly unlawful practice.
Adhering to this standard tips the balance between an employee's right to
speak and an employer's province to manage its employees too sharply in
favor of the employer. Employer actions that may have a significant
negative effect on an employee's situation in the workplace, but are not
"ultimate," could be rendered inactionable by courts under this interpreta-
tion of adverse employment action.
C. The Intermediate Approach
Representing the middle ground, the Second and Third Circuits require
some material affectation of a term or condition of employment in order to
make an adequate showing under the adverse employment action element53
In Torres v. Pisano, Torres filed charges with the EEOC alleging her
supervisor sexually harassed her and created a hostile work environmentf 4
Later, Torres was asked by different supervisors to drop the EEOC charges,
48 Id at 709.
49Ledergerber, 122 F.3d at 1144.
10Id at 1143.
51 l
52 Id
53See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997);
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 640 (2d Cir. 1997).
54Torres, 116 F.3d at 628-29.
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which Torres alleged was retaliation.55 The court disagreed, because in this
instance, Tones suffered "no negative consequences" for refusing to drop
the charges and the conditions of her employment were not altered in a
material way 6 The court reiterated, "[w]e have held that '[r]easonable
defensive measures do not violate the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII,
even though such steps are adverse to the charging employee and result in
differential treatment,' so long as they 'do not affect the complainant's
work, working conditions, or compensation.' 5 In fact, the court stated that
Torres' employment situation had improved.58
The Third Circuit also uses the material affectation requirement. The
rationale of the court is that actions that "make[ ] an employee unhappy"
are simply not enough for her to claim adverse employment action.59
Moreover, permitting these sorts of claims would allow any "chip-on-the-
shoulder employee" to bring an action based on only minor incidents.'
Iml. THE ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISION IN CONTEXT:
WHAT DOES DISCRIMINATION MEAN?
The essential problem for courts regarding the interpretation ofthe term
"discrimination" is that the text of § 704(a) is not dispositive.6' There are
no pegs on which a court can hang its hat to identify concrete examples of
what constitutes adverse employment action. Commentators have stated:
Once a plaintiff establishes that she has engaged in protected activity,
courts must then determine whether the employer's conduct constitutes
"retaliation." Importantly, both Title VII and the ADEA contain no
language regarding the type of employer conduct that will trigger a
retaliation claim. The anti-retaliation provisions speak only in terms of
"discrimination" in that it is "an unlawful employment practice for an
551d at 629.
56Id at 640.
5 Id (quoting United States v. New York City Transit Auth., 97 F.3d 672,677
(2d Cir. 1996)).
58 Id
59 See Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3d Cir. 1997)
(citing Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 441 (7th Cir. 1996)).
0 See Robinson, 120 F.3d at 1300.
61 See Melissa A. Essary & Terence D. Friedman, Retaliation Claims Under
Title VII, theADEA , andtheADA: Untouchable Employees, Uncertain Employers,
Unresolved Courts, 63 Mo. L. REv. 115, 132-33 (1998).
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employer to discriminate against any of his employees or applicants"
because of their participation in opposition activities. Hence, the plain
language of these two Act... gives little guidance as to what constitutes
prohibited retaliation.62
In addition, courts struggle to ascertain the meaning of § 704(a) in the
absence of any significant legislative history.' The legislative history that
is on record supports the conclusion that virtually any employer action
constituting adverse employment action is beyond the pale: "[Management]
prerogatives.., are to be left undisturbed to the greatest extent possible.
Internal affairs of employers... must not be interfered with except to the
limited extent that correction is required in discrimination practices."' The
circuit courts have been forced to glean their own interpretations of the
exact scope of the language in § 704. Not surprisingly, they have reached
varying and inconsistent results. By examining the approach taken by the
majority and minority positions to determine the contours of the anti-
retaliation provision, it becomes clear that the intermediate approach
comports best with both the language of the anti-retaliation provision, in
particular, and the language of the statute as a whole. Both the liberal and
the conservative circuit approaches have relied on the absence of qualifying
terms surrounding the term "discrimination" in § 704(a) to reach their
respective conclusions that retaliatory behavior spans either a wide or a
narrow spectrum.' The Fifth Circuit opinion in Mattern is illustrative of
the most restrictive interpretation.' Rather than allowing a variety of
behaviors to be adverse employment action based on the lack of listed
behaviors in the anti-retaliation provision, it interprets the lack of enumer-
ated behaviors to be an exclusion of all but the more extreme behavior with
regard to what is an adverse employment action.67 While this interpretation
62 Id
63 See Donna Smith Cude & Brian M. Steger, Does Justice Need Glasses?
Unlawful Retaliation Under Title VU Following Mattem: Will Courts Know It
When They See It?, 14 LAB. LAw. 373, 397 (1998).
64 Id (alteration in original).
65See discussion supra Part II. Specifically, § 704(a) states "[i]t shall be an
unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate" against an
employee after an employee has opposed an allegedly unlawful employment action
or participated in an EEOC proceeding. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1994).
66 See Mattern v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702 (5th Cir. 1997).
67 Mattern allows only hiring and firing, or "ultimate employment decisions,"
to qualify as retaliatory behavior by an employer. See id at 707.
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may be closer to a bright line test and thus easier for courts to apply, its
application creates an unreasonably exclusionary standard for an em-
ployer's behavior.68
The Fifth Circuit relies on § 703 to aid in its interpretation of § 704.69
The court relied solely on the first part of the statutory language in § 703
to restrict adverse employment actions only to ultimate employment
decisions even though § 703 clearly enumerates that other behaviors that
affect terms or conditions of employment are potentially discriminatory as
well. 0 Relying only on a select portion of the language does not provide an
accurate interpretation of the meaning of discrimination in order to
determine what constitutes adverse employment action. The bright line test
adopted by the conservative circuits (only "ultimate" decisions qualify as
adverse) is tempting because of its easier application, but it is inaccurate in
ignoring the plain language of § 703, which details that discrimination
regarding terms or conditions of employment constitutes unlawful
employer action as well.
On the other hand, the Seventh Circuit in Knox v. Indiana examined
Title VII and case law addressing retaliation and reached the opposite
result-almost any behavior may qualify as retaliatory.' It does not
necessarily follow that the lack of enumerated behaviors listed in the statute
" See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text.
6 See Mattern, 104 F.3d at 708-09.
70See id Section 703 provides that unlawful employment action is:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, orprivileges ofemployment, becauseofsuch individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees... in any way which
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
Section 704, the anti-retaliation provision, reads in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees... because he has opposed any
practice made an unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or
because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any
manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this subchapter.
Id § 2000e-3(a).
n See id § 2000e-2(a).
7 See Knox v. Indiana, 93 F.3d 1327, 1333-34 (7th Cir. 1996).
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mandates that any behavior be the target of potential employer liability.'
Such an interpretation allows the law a free hand to characterize "office
politics" as retaliatory under this provision of Title VII.74 Interoffice
disputes wholly unconnected to an employee's preexisting objection to
allegedly unlawful behavior under Title VII could now be a source of
potential liability for employers. 5 These matters would be better handled
by an employer's internal policies rather than by federal law.76 While
employees do need some protection from unfair treatment as a result of
bona fide objection to employer policies, recognizing any subsequent
conduct as potentially retaliatory invades the province of the
employer/employee relationship.' Making employers subject to a § 704(a)
suit for any action that an employee may find unfair is an undue burden on
employers by forcing them to police their every action once an employee
has opposed one of its policies or has filed a complaint with the EEOC.71
Allowing employers to develop their own policies and procedures to govern
relationships with employees following an objection to discriminatory
behavior encourages amicable relations pending the proceeding. At the
same time, the courts are available if the employer should engage in
behavior beyond the scope of its policy.
Other liberal circuits have largely ignored reading other duly enacted
sections of Title VII in construing the meaning of discrimination as it
applies to adverse employment actions." For instance, the First Circuit
opinion in Wyatt demonstrates that viewing employer actions, such as
restrictions on which classes could be taught by a teacher, as adverse
' See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
74 See supra notes 25-43 and accompanying text.
75 See Stephanie Armour & Barbara Hansen, Flood of 'Retaliation' Cases
Surfacing in U.S. Workplace, USA TODAY, Feb. 10, 1999, at IA (stating that
"[b]osses might fear they can't demote a bad performer if that worker has ever
complained about harassment or discrimination. If they do, they fear a lawsuit,"
and also commenting that opposing an employer policy gives 'job protection for
life").
76 Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP, Employer
Retaliation: Winning the Battle but Losing the War, LA. EMP. L. LETrER, Nov.
2000.
See Armour & Hansen, supra note 75.
7 Vicky Ramsey Conwell, Bosses'Retaliation Bringing Lawsuits, ATLANTA J.
& CONST., Aug. 1, 1999, at 1R.
" The liberal circuits largely rely on secondary sources to glean the meaning of
discrimination in § 704(a). See, e.g., Wyatt v. City of Boston, 35 F.3d 13, 15-16
(1st Cir. 1994) (per curiam).
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employment action, ° is an unwarranted expansion of the element's scope
because it fails to adequately consider analysis from other areas of Title
VII.3'
Some courts and the EEOC rely on the overarching purpose of Title VII
as a remedial statute to allow a wide variety of behavior to qualify under
the adverse employment action element.' For example, the Tenth Circuit's
opinion in Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet relies on the remedial nature of
Title VII to establish a broad scope of retaliatory behavior.' In Berry,
malicious prosecution charges were filed against a former employee and the
court found those actions met the retaliation standard." Similarly, the
Eleventh Circuit allows a broad range of employer action to meet the
adverse employment action element based on the remedial purpose of Title
VII.1 The court in Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., stated that allowing
only ultimate employment actions would chill "employees' willingness to
file charges of discrimination."
The positions in Berry and Wideman are directly contrary to that of the
Supreme Court in Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, which declared that the
purpose of Title VII is "to influence primary" behavior, "not to provide
redress."" When viewed in this context, the liberal construction of § 704(a)
is directly inconsistent with the Supreme Court statement on this issue.
Therefore, the basis on which the Berry and Wideman courts infer wide
liability-the "remedial" purpose of Title VII-is controversial. In fact, one
author argues:
While providing remedies to discrimination victims represents an
important goal of Title VII, the statute best serves its function when it
so See id
" Part of the difficulty in defining what constitutes "discrimination" in the
context of § 704(a) of Title VII lies in the fact that there is very little legislative
history to guide courts regarding the types of behavior the section contemplates as
retaliatory. See Cude & Steger, supra note 63, at 397. The liberal circuits tend to
read the lack of enumerated prohibited behaviors in the section as leading to
limitless possibilities of liability. See discussion supra Part II.A.
" See, e.g., Berry v. Stevinson Chevrolet, 74 F.3d 980, 986 (10th Cir. 1996);
see also discussion infra Part IV.
8See Berry, 74 F.3d at 986.
Id
u See Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (1 1th Cir.
1998).
v6 Idd
"I Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 806 (1998) (emphasis added).
2001-2002]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
prevents discrimination from occurring in the first place.... Courts have
emphasized that Congress intended to encourage employers and employ-
ees to conciliate rather than litigate their grievances involving discrimina-
tion within the workplace."8
The Second and Third Circuits' approach incorporates all of the terms
of § 704(a), truest to the language of the statute." The Second Circuit
stated "[w]e have held that'[r]easonable defensive measures do not violate
the anti-retaliation provision of Title VII, even though such steps are
adverse to the charging employee and result in differential treatment,'so
long as they 'do not affect the complainant's work, working conditions, or
compensation.' "" Requiring affectation of the terms or conditions of
employment is consistent with the language of § 704(a).9 In addition, the
language in § 703 supports the approach taken by the intermediate
position.' Section 703(a), which outlines behavior by an employer that
constitutes discrimination, provides the guidance lacking in the anti-
retaliation provision of § 704.91
The scope of unlawful employment action is identified with far more
precision in § 703 of Title VII than the amorphous reference to the term in
the anti-retaliation section. To aid courts in the interpretation of"discrimi-
nation" with regard to determining behavior covered under adverse
employment action, § 703(a) is helpful in placing some limits on the scope
of prohibited behavior. Section 703(a) connects discriminatory behavior
with employer action related to ultimate employment decisions, as well as
to terms or conditions ofemployment"4 Section 703(a) delineates that only
"s Ann M. Henry, Comment, Employer and Employee Reasonableness Regard-
ing Retaliation Under the Ellerth/Faragher Affirmative Defense, 1999 U. CI.
LEGAL F. 553, 568.
9 See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997);
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
o Torres, 116 F.3d at 640 (quoting United States v. New York City Transit
Auth., 97 F.3d 672, 677 (2d Cir. 1996)).
91 See supra note 8.
2 See supra note 70.
See supra note 70.
94Section 703 provides that unlawful employment action is:
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation,
terms, conditions, orprivileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees... in any way which
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actions affecting a person's terms or conditions of employment can
constitute unlawful employer action with regard to certain claims.95
Companion cases from the Supreme Court, Burlington Industries, Inc. v.
Ellerth6 and Faragher97 address § 703(a) of Title VII, and are instructive
to courts struggling to determine what behavior "discrimination" covers
under § 704(a) in the adverse employment action context. The Court
determined that, "Title VII is violated by either explicit or constructive
alterations in the terms or conditions of employment and to explain the
latter must be severe or pervasive."'
The Court in Ellerth held that an employer is vicariously liable for the
sexually harassing acts of its employees when the victim suffers from a
tangible employment action." Similarly, Faragher held that to bring a
meritorious claim of a hostile work environment under the Title VII sexual
harassment provision, the conduct has to be "extreme to amount to a change
in the terms and conditions of employment."'"
Considering the three positions taken by the circuits in interpreting
adverse employment, the intermediate approach of the Second and Third
Circuits most closely conforms to the language of Title VII as a whole.
Moreover, the Second and Third Circuits' requirement of a connection
between retaliatory action and a term or condition of employment conforms
to Title VII's conciliatory aim as described in the Faragher decision.'
would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportuni-
ties or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994).
95 See id.
96 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998).
97 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775 (1998).
98 Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 752. This language is similar to that used by the Second
and Third Circuits in interpreting § 704. See discussion supra Part ll.C.
99Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 753-54. Drawing aparallel to adverse employment action,
holding employers liable for tangible affectations of employment is consistent with
the retaliatory actions for which an employer should be subject to liability.
10 Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788. The use of the word "extreme" is indicative of
the fact that there are some behaviors that are simply not serious enough to merit
unlimited redressability for a sexual harassment suit under Title VII. Applying
similar logic to adverse employment action, there are some behaviors that are also
not serious enough to affect a term or condition of employment. By adopting such
a broad span of behavior as constituting adverse employment action, the liberal
circuits unfairly subject employers to increased liability on claims of retaliation
from which they would be protected in a § 703(a) suit.
101 Id at 805-06.
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IV. THE EEOC GUIDELINES:
HELPFUL HINTS OR MISPLACED MANTRA?
In 1998, the EEOC issued new guidelines in its manual detailing what
it considers to qualify as adverse employment action."°2 "Obvious"
examples of adverse employment action include "denial of promotion,
refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, suspension and
discharge."' 3 All of these actions are consistent with the intermediate
approach that requires a connection between the employment action and a
term or condition of employment."' The EEOC justifies its policy
regarding these actions because it prevents "a chilling effect upon the
willingness of individuals to speak out against employment discrimination
orto participate in the EEOC's administrative process... ,,"05 Ensuringthat
adverse employment action encompasses only those actions ofan employer
that actually inflict an employmentrelated detriment on an employee makes
sense on two fronts: first, employers and employees can manage other types
of behavior, i.e., that of other employees, internally, and second, it keeps
frivolous claims out of the courts.
The Mattern dissent, for example, examines the EEOC guidelines to
outline a broad array of actions that could qualify as adverse employment
action."° The dissent aligns itself with the more liberal circuits in allowing
a wide range of behavior to constitute adverse employment action.'
0 7
The EEOC carries adverse employment action to the extreme,
recognizing "threats, reprimands, negative evaluations, harassment or other
adverse treatment" as behavior falling within the scope of adverse
employment action."° In fact, the EEOC expressly rejects the strict and
intermediate approaches:
The Commission disagrees with those decisions and concludes that
such constructions are unduly restrictive. The statutory retaliation clauses
'0 2 Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n, EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, Direc-
tives TransmittalNo. 915.003, § 8 (May20,1998) [hereinafterEEOC COMPLIANCE
MANUAL].
10 3 See id
"o See supra Part II.C.
105 EEOCProvides BroadProtectionfor Workers Who Oppose Discrimination,
FED. EEO ADvisOR, Mar. 1999.
'6 See Mattem v. Eastman Kodak Co., 104 F.3d 702, 711 (5th Cir. 1997)
(Dennis, J., dissenting).
"o7 Id; see also discussion supra Part II.A.
'Os EEOC COMPLIANCE MANUAL, supra note 102, Directives Transmittal No.
915.003, § 8.
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prohibit any adverse treatment that is based on a retaliatory motive and is
reasonably likely to deter the charging party or others from engaging in
protected activity. Of course, petty slights and trivial annoyances are not
actionable, as they are not likely to deter protected activity. More
significant retaliatory treatment, however, can be challengedregardless of
the level of harm. °9
The amorphous reference to "more significant retaliatory treatment" only
muddies the waters for courts in determining adverse employment action,
particularly absent any other guidance than "reasonably likely" to deter
protected activity. Presumably, almost any negative feedback an employee
receives could be construed as related to her opposition of an alleged
unlawful practice.1'0
A spectrum this broad is grossly unfair to employers who must handle
internal office politics and have a reasonable opportunity to protect their
interests from a disgruntled employee.' The consequence of such a wide
array of potential liability hinders the ability of employers to effectively
manage employees, inciting fear of retaliation if a manager gives a poor
evaluation to an employee." 2 In addition, employees receive a halo of
protection after they have complained about alleged unlawful discrimina-
tion that may be unjustified, particularly since liability for these alleged
practices has yet to be established." 3
In essence, without some sort of tangible connection to a detriment
related to employment, employers are subject to seemingly unlimited
liability for every negative experience of an employee because there is no
guidance on what is "reasonably related" to the protection of an employee's
right to oppose certain employer practices."' This forced "hands off'
approach makes everyone a loser. The courts, forced to determine adverse
action on a case-by-case basis because of the wide array of opinions, are
already overwhelmed with litigation in this arena." Following the EEOC
guidelines will do little to ameliorate the volume of or confusion involved
'09 Id
"0 Conwell, supra note 78 (noting that "almost any adverse action against an
employee who has claimed discrimination... can be viewed as retaliatory, whether
it is or not").
.. Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP, supra note
76.
"
2 See Lewis, supra note 15.
"' See Higgins, supra note 13, at 26.
"1 See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text.
"s See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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with these cases. Limiting adverse employment action to denial of pro-
motion, refusal to hire, denial of job benefits, demotion, suspension, and
discharge allows for litigation of meritorious cases as well as appropriate
internal management of affairs by employers." 6 The position of the Second
and Third Circuits best comports with this approach-recognizing actions
as adverse which have a tangible effect on the essence of the employment
relationship-the employee's job.
V. CONCLUSION
The conflict among the circuits over the adverse employment action
element of a retaliation claim is one ripe for Supreme Court resolution. " 7
The application of disparate standards to individual cases "has left
employers to guess what employment actions might be considered unlawful
retaliation." ' The best standard to determine behavior prohibited by the
Title VII's anti-retaliation provision is the intermediate position adopted by
the Second and Third Circuits requiring a material effect on a term or
condition of employment. " 9 This position both eliminates the harsh
consequences to employees of the bright line ultimate employment action
test and protects employers from a wide scope of liability under the most
liberal interpretation of the element. 2 ' In short, this position is an
acceptable middle ground representing the mostjustway to provide redress
without allowing suits to go forward on baseless claims. Barring employees
from bringing a retaliatory suit based on trivial adverse employment actions
allows employers to focus on eradicating discrimination within the
workplace rather than spending their resources on defending suits that are
I6 See Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere & Denegre, LLP, supra
note 76. The authors' suggestions for internal policies include providing a
statement on protection from retaliation in the discrimination and harassment
policy, restating this policy when investigating a discrimination claim, and training
managers regarding retaliation and its consequences. Id
I7 See Wolf, supra note 16 (quoting Eric Athey who stated, "retaliation is a
legal 'battleground' that needs to be clarified by the courts. Judges must decide
what constitutes retaliation-'is it being fired, being demoted, being transferred or
even being given a smaller office?' He further commented, '[tihere needs to be one
standard.'").
Jill E. Jachera, Retaliation Claims, METRO. CORP. COUNS., Aug. 1999.
19 See, e.g., Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286 (3d Cir. 1997);
Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625 (2d Cir. 1997).
"2o See discussion supra Part II.
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essentially internal problems among employees best handled by their own
adjudicatory procedures.'
In addition, the Second and Third Circuit's approach is more consistent
with the language of§ 703 (a) regarding prohibited discriminatory behavior
by an employer in other contexts." The overall purpose of Title VII,
promoting employer/employee conciliation, rather than remedy, supports
raising the bar on adverse employment action to require some nexus to a
condition of employment."z Holding employers liable for retaliatory
actions parallel to the liability for actions under § 703(a) is a logical
inference to draw. By refusing to recognize behavior too remote from any
connection to the employee's job as retaliatory, the intermediate standard
best helps courts to draw the line on liability for adverse employment
action by protecting both employers and employees.'24
"2 Conwell, supra note 78 (noting that "companies spend an average of
$100,000" on these lawsuits, and litigation ranges from weeks to years). Clearly,
internal procedures are inadequate to handle employer behavior meant to exact
vengeance on an employee for protesting an allegedly unlawful practice. An action
taken to jeopardize an employee's career is unquestionably handled best by redress
to the judiciary. The most appropriate time for the application of Title VII is in this
circumstance. When terms or conditions of employment are affected, it is clear that
deference to reconciliation of problems via internal procedures is no longer
effective. In this context, the employer can likely no longer be an objective arbiter
of the employee's interests. When the veiy nexus of the employer/employee
relationship-the employee's job-is threatened, even short of discharge,
employees are certainly within the purview of adverse employment action. This
means, however, that the employee must point to more than petty office disputes
and derogatory comments to establish the right to a remedy.
, See discussion supra Part Il arguing that incorporating the behaviors enu-
merated as discriminatory in this section are helpful guidelines to determine the
parameters of discriminatory behavior in the anti-retaliation section.
n3 See discussion supra Part HI.
'2 See Wolf, supra note 16 (quoting Eric Athey that "employers need to be
'more affirmative' in tackling harassment complaints, checking regularly with
employees after resolving the issue to make sure the solution is working").
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